DELAY IN ACTING ON AN APPLICATION
FOR INSURANCE
WInum2m L. PROSSER*

N THESE days it is a courageous man who takes up the cudgels on
behalf of an insurance company, and against the widow and the
orphan. The problem of the liability of an insurer who fails to accept
or to reject an application for insurance within a reasonable time after
receipt by its agent, already has been considered at length in a number of
excellent articles.' Until five years ago, it seemed beyond dispute that
the law was moving rapidly in the direction of liability,2 and that liability
3
might be justified upon any one of half a dozen highly ingenious theories.
4
But a series of recent decisions, some of them very emphatic, if not force* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
x Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 207
Parkhil, Effect of Delay in Acting upon an Application for Insurance, 7 Fla. Bar
Assn. J. 219 (1934); Jones, Tort or No Tort, 56 Chi. Leg. N. 366, 2 Proceedings Assn. of Life
Ins. Counsel 389 (1924); Wells, Is a Life Insurance Company Liable in Tort?, 2 Miss. L. J. 293
(1930); Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 64, pp. 188-194 (2d ed. 193o); see notes in
4o Yale L. J. 121 (1930); 32 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1934); 6 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 224 (1934);
13 B. U. L. Rev. 734 (I933); 9 Wis. L. Rev. 183 (1934); 1o Wis. L. Rev. 289 (1935); 15 Minn.
L. Rev. 833 (1931).
(1927);

2 Wilkin v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828, i57 N. W.
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(i916); Wallace v. Hartford

Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 48r, I74 Pac. ioo9 (1918); Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 17,
(1922), 27 A.L.R. 444; Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., i85 N.C. 121, ix6
205 Pac. iI
S.E. 266 (1923); De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Dyer
v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925); Lewis v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 22o Ala. 270, 124 So. 889 (1929); Kukuska v. Home
Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 4o3 (I93I); see Behnke v. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co., 2 F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 7th 1930).
3 Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev.
(1927); see note in 4o Yale L. J. 121 (1930).
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4 Miler v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 255 Ill. App. 586 (1930); Thornton v. National Council
Junior Order United American Mechanics, iio W.Va. 412, i58 S.E. 507 (i931); Munger v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (D.C. Mo. 1933); Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
16 Conn. 526, 165 Atl. 686 (i933); Schliep v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 479, 254

N.W. 68 (i934); American Life Ins. Co. v. Nabors, 76 S.W. (2d) 497 (Tex. Comm. App. 1934).
In addition there may be listed the cases of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 95 Ind.
App. 564, 174 N.E. 99 (1932); Moonv. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 83,23 P. (2d) 444
(i933); and Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (I933), which
seem to be retreating from the view of liability previously taken. Also three cases in which the
court, with an excellent opportunity to approve a theory of liability, avoided the issue, and
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ful, in their language, appear to have altered very abruptly the trend of
the cases. These decisions suggest a new examination of the question,
with the possibility of a different conclusion.
The more or less standardized procedure by which contracts of insurance are made is too familiar to require description.5 The applicant
for insurance is induced, usually by a soliciting agent of the company, to
sign a formal document, designated an "application," which takes the
form of an offer looking toward a contract. This application is filled in
on a printed form provided by the company, and drawn by its attorneys,
and the applicant usually is given no opportunity to suggest or change
any of its terms. The agent who takes the application has no authority
to conclude a contract, 6 and his function is merely to transmit the application, together with any premium paid in advance, to the home office
of the company for examination by the proper officials. If the risk is
approved, a policy of insurance is prepared and executed, which then is
forwarded to the agent for delivery to the applicant. At some point after
such approval, the contract becomes complete; but not before. The application is quite clearly nothing more than an offer, which requires acceptance by the home office before any insurance is to take effect, and it is
so understood by the applicant. Most companies7 now protect themselves
disposed of the case on other grounds. Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. i, 273
Pac. 667 (1929) (cf.Dunne v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 35 Wyo. 59, 246 Pac. 246 (1926));
Veser v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 44 Ohio App. 293, 185 N.E. 565 (1932); Weaver v. West Coast
Life Ins. Co., 42 P. (2d) 729 (Mont. 1935).
s See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198 (igig);
Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance 174 (2d ed. 1930).

6 If the agent has such authority and concludes the contract, the insurer of course is
bound, and the problem involved here does not arise. Fire insurance agents are given
the power to accept the risk more frequently than life insurance agents, and the courts
occasionally have taken notice of this fact. See Neuberger v. Aid A-sn. for Lutherans, 207
Wis. 133, 24o N.W. 885 (1932); Hertz v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Minn. 147, 154 N.W. 745
(i915). In Eastern Shore of Virginia Fire Ins. Co. v. Kellam, .59 Va. 93, 165 S.E. 637 (1932),
it was held that the apparent authority of even a general fire insurance agent to make an oral
contract was limited to the time reasonably necessary to issue and deliver a written policy, plus
a reasonable time to cover delays and a short period of grace.
7In 19o5 L. G. Fouse, president of a life insurance company, declared that all of fifty-one
representative companies inserted provisions that the policies should not take effect until they
were delivered during the lifetime and good health of the applicant, with actual payment of the
first premium. 26 Annals Acad. Pol. and Soc. SCi. 209, 220 (igog), Yale Readings in Insurance,
207, 219 (1909).
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John A. Coke, Jr., attorney for the Life Insurance Co. of Virginia,

125

applications and policies examined, eighty-seven required both de-
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by inserting in the application express provisions that there shall be no
insurance until the formal policy has been delivered to the applicant, and
the first premium paid."
The company of course is entitled to a reasonable time to pass on the
application. 9 After such a reasonable time has elapsed, common courtesy
and a decent consideration for the applicant, to say nothing of orderly
business practice, require that the company send notice that the application is rejected, or that more time is required. If the company, or its
agent, takes no action, the applicant continues to be deprived of the
use of any money paid in advance; but more important than this is the
fact that he is not insured. If a loss occurs, there is no policy to cover it;
and there is a possibility that if he had been notified, he might have obtained protection elsewhere. The apparent hardship upon the applicant,
especially where it is clear that he was an acceptable risk and the company
had no reason for rejecting him, calls for sympathy, and has led to the
development of a great deal of hard case law.
The doctrine of liability of the insurance company for unreasonable
delay is of comparatively recent origin. There were dicta in a few early
cases' ° indicating that there might be recovery on the theory of negligence, and a decision of the supreme court of Hawaii,- which attracted
little attention, first confirmed the suggestion; but it was not until 1912
that Kansas,2 followed almost at once by Iowa, 3 really set the tort theory

in motion. Liability has been supported, upon one basis or another, in
livery in good health and payment of the first premium as conditions precedent to the commencement of the risk. The Commencement of the Risk in the Case of a Life Insurance
Policy, i Proceedings of Assn. Life Ins. Counsel, no. 51 (1921).
8 The following provision is typical: "The company shall incur no liability under this
application, until it shall have been received and approved at the home office of the said company, the policy issued and delivered to me during my life time and good health, and the first
premium paid and accepted by the company or its authorized agent."
9This is recognized by courts holding that unreasonable delay will impose liability. Meyer
v. Central States Life Ins. Co., io3 Neb. 640, 173 N.W. 578 (igig); De Ford v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 81 Colo. 518, 256 Pac. 317 (1927); Evans v. International Life Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 264,
252 Pac. 266 (1927); Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 7th 1930);
Winn v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 205 Iowa 1249, 250 N.W. 459 (i933).
xoPerkins v. Washington Ins. Co., 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 645 (i825); Walker v. Farmers' Ins. Co.,
5i Iowa 679, 2 N.W. 583 (1879); Trask v. German Ins. Co., 53 Mo. App. 625 (1893); Stewart
v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co., 102 Cal. 218, 36 Pac. 410 (1894).
11Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., ix Hawaii 69 (1897).
Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 443, 121 Pac. 329 (X912), 40
L.R.A. (N.S.) 164, Ann. Cas. I9i5A 671.
X3Duffie v. Bankers' Life Assn., 16o Iowa ig, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25.
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Alabama, 4 California, 5 Colorado,' 6 Hawaii, 7 Idaho,"5 Iowa, 9 Kansas,2 0
Kentucky,2 1 Michigan,22 Nebraska,' North Carolina,' 4 North Dakota,'5
Oklahoma,' 6 Tennessee 2 7 Washington,28 Wisconsin,'29 and a federal circuit
'4 Lewis

v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,

220

Ala.

270, 124

So. 889

(1929).
IS Stark

v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 34 P. (2d) 731 (Cal. App. 1934).

z6 De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924). Upon a second

appeal, it was held that the delay was not unreasonable. De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
81 Colo. V18, 256 Pac. 317 (1927).
X7 Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., ii Hawaii 69 (1897).
18Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, x74 Pac. xoo9 (Ii8).
29 Duffme v. Bankers' Life Assn., i6o Iowa ig, 139 N.W. 1o87 (i913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25;
Johnson v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 184 Iowa 630, z68 N.W. 264 (I9z8); Mortimer v. Farmers' Mut.
Fire and Lightning Ins. Assn., 217 Iowa 1246, 249 N.W. 405 (1933). See also Winn v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 1249, 250 N.W. 459 (x933).
21Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 6I Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899) (contract theory); Boyer
v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912), 4 o L.R.A. (N.S.) 164,
Ann. Cas. 1915A 671; see Evans v. International Life Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 264, 252 Pac. 266
(1927). But cf. Moon v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 83, 23 P. (2d) 444 (i933).
21 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1026 Tigii) (dictum);
see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Haynes, io Ky. L. Rep. 276 (1888) and Halle v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 740, 58 S.W. 822 (igoo), both holding that under the terms of the
application the contract of insurance was effective at once, subject to the right to reject.
-2Robinson v. United States Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. eii, 102 Am. St. Rep. 436

(i9o3) (contract theory).

" In Wilken v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828, 157 N.W. 1021 (i916), the court found
liability on the theory of negligence of the agent, chargeable to the company. In Meyer v.
Central States Life Ins. Co., IO3 Neb. 640, 173 N.W. 578 (1919), a dictum rejected the idea of
tort liability, and a concurring opinion opposed it vigorously. Later decisions indicate that the
earlier case will be followed. See Handlier v. Knights of Columbus, io6 Neb. 267, 183 N.W. 300
(1921); Page v. National Automobile Ins. Co., iog Neb. 127, 190 N.W. 213 (1922); Strand v.
Bankers' Life Ins. Co., iiS Neb. 357, 213 N.W. 349 (X927); Rhoads v. Columbia Fire Underwriters' Agency, 26o N.W. 174 (Neb. 1935).

Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., i85 N.C. 121, ii6 S.E. 266 (1923).
s An unreported decision of a lower court, tacitly approved in In re Coughlin's Estate,
53 N.D. i88, 205 N.W. 14 (1925). See also Stearns v. Merchants' Life and Cas. Co., 38 N.D.
524, 165 N.W. 568 (I917).
26 Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151 (1922), 27 A.L.R. 444; Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923); Childers v. New York
Life Ins. Co., I17 Okla. 7, 245 Pac. 59 (X925); Brown v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 124
'4

Okla. 155, 254 Pac. 7 (1927).
" Richmond v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 123 Tenn. 307, 130 S.W. 790 (IgIO), 3o L.R.A. (N.S.)
954 (dictum that there may be estoppel against the company).
28Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925), Affd. 135 Wash.
693, 236 Pac. 807 (1925).
'9 Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. i66, 235 N.W. 403 (I93). In
Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933), the court expressed
considerable doubt whether life insurance was subject to the same condusion, and disposed of
the case upon the ground that no damages had been proved.
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court of appeals. 0 Liability has been rejected definitely in Arkansas, 31
Connecticut,32 Illinois, 33 Minnesota, 34 Mississippi,35 Texas, 36 West Vir39
38
ginia,37 a federal district court of Missouri, and probably in Indiana;
43
4°
4
while Missouri, Ohio, ' Wyoming,42 and Montana have refused to take
any stand.
An examination of the twenty-odd cases sustaining the liability of the
insurance company for unreasonable delay immediately reveals the fact
that there is more agreement upon the conclusion that the company should
pay than upon any process of reasoning to support it, and conveys the
44
impression that "most of them were written with scissors and paste."
Many of the theories advanced seem to justify the recent comment of
Judge Otis:
At first thought one is almost led to say that these are bricks made without straw,
and also without clay, which, moreover, never have been baked. One is inclined to
think that the cases .... which were not reasoned (but went on precedent), after all
were the best reasoned.4s
30 Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 4 F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 7th 1930) (dicum).
31National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School District No. 55, 122 Ark. 179, x82 S.W. 547
(x96), L.R.A. 19r6D 238; Inter-State Business Men's Acc. Assn. v. Nichols, 143 Ark. 369,
220 S.W. 477 (r920).
32 Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1i6 Conn. 526, i65 Atl. 686 (1933).
33 Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill.
381, 129 N.E. 171 (X920); Miller v. Illinois Life
Ins. Co., 255 Ill. App. 586 (1930).
34 Schliep v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 479, 254 N.W. 618 (x934); Tjepkes v.
State Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 259 N.W. 2 (Minn. 1935).
s Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929).
36 American Life Ins. Co. v. Nabors, 76 S.W. (2d) 497 (Tex. Comm. App. 1934), reversing
48 S.W. (2d) 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). To the contrary is Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
Dolan, 239 S.W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (contract, and estoppel) reversed in 262 S.W. 475
(Tex. Comm. App. 1924), on the ground that there was no contract with the agent.
37Thornton v. National Council Junior Order United American Mechanics, iio W.Va. 412,
158 S.E. 507 (193r); Chittum v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 177 S.E. 782 (W.Va. 1934).
38 Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
39 There is a dichum in Live Stock Ins. Assn. v. Stickler, 64 Ind. App. 191, ii5 N.E. 691
(r917), that there may be tort liability. But in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 95 Ind.
App. 564, 174 N.E. 99 (1932), the court refused to hold the company liable where no advance
premium bad been paid, and apparently disapproved liability in any case.
4o Forck v. Prudential Ins. Co., 66 S.W. (2d) 983 (Mo. App. 1933) (does not disclose the

,-ourt's position,

but if anything favors liability).

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 44 Ohio App. 293, 185 N.E. 565 (1932).
42Dunne v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 35 Wyo. 59, 246 Pac. 246 (1926) (no liability in the
absence of a premium payment); Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. I, 273 Pac. 667
4' Veser

(1929).
43 Weaver

v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 42 P. (2d) 729 (Mont. 1935).
J., in Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
45 Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
44 Otis,
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In the face of a dozen diversified theories, it is difficult to do more than
to tabulate the list, with the objections which may be made to each. At
the outset we are met with a series of attempts to evolve some principle
upon which the insurer may be held to have entered into a contract, even
in the absence of any intent to do so.
I. SILENCE GIVES CONSENT

The application is an offer looking toward a contract. It may be accepted by an expression of assent on the.part of the company. The company has solicited the offer, and so has indicated in advance its willingness
to contract if the risk is acceptable. Reasonable men would reject such
an offer promptly, if there were no intent to accept it. It is contended
therefore that failure to reject within a reasonable time is an acceptance
46
on the part of the company, which completes the contract of insurance.
Such a contention is contrary to well established principles of contract
4
law,47 and is repudiated by an overwhelming array of insurance cases. 8
46Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899); Robinson v. United
States Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. 211 (1903), 102 Am. St. Rep. 436; Great Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 239 S.W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), reversed on rehearing 262 S.W.
475 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924); Cloyd v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 869, 22 P. (2d)

43' ('933).
47 Restatement, Contracts § 72 (1932); i Williston, Contracts § 9i (1920); 1 Page, Contracts §§ xso, i6o, 161 (I9O5); Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 Yale L. J. I69 (1917); 29 Yale L. J. 44i (1920); 33 Harv. L. Rev. 595 (1920).
48 Misselhorn v. Mutual Reserve Fund Assn., 3o Fed. 545 (C.C. Mo. 1887); Steinle v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 8r Fed. 489 (C.C.A. 5 th 1897); Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, 6r
Ala. 163 (1878); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School District No. 55, 122 Ark. 179, 182

S.W. 547 (i9i6), L.R.A. i9i6D 238; Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co.,

102

Cal. 218

(1894); Easley v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 5 Idaho 593, 51 Pac. 418 (1897); Miller v. Illinois Life
Ins. Co., 255 1l. App. 586 (1930); Live Stock Ins. Assn. v. Stickler, 64 Ind. App. I9I, I15 N.E.
691 (1917); Walker v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 5X Iowa 679, 2 N.W. 447 (1879); Trask v. German
Ins. Co., 53 Mo. App. 625 (1893); St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 720,
89 N.W. 997 (1902); Handlier v. Knights of Columbus, io6 Neb. 267, 183 N.W. 300 (1921);
More v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 537, 29 N.E. 757 (1892); Ross v. New York

Life Ins. Co.,

124

N.C. 395, 32 S.E. 733 (i899); Home Forum Benefit Order v. Jones, 5 Okla.

598, 5o Pac. i65 (1897); Dorman v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 41 Okla. 509, x39 Pac. 262
(1914), 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873; Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72 (1854); Royal Ins. Co. v.

Beatty, iig Pa. St. 6, 12 At. 607 (i888); Brink v. Merchants' and Farmers' United Mut. Ins.
Co., 7 S.D. 235, 95 N.W. 929 (x9o3); McLendon v. Woodmen of the World, io6 Tenn. 695,
64 S.W. 36 (igoi); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rudolph, 45 Tex. 454 (1876); Haden v.
Farmers and Merchants Fire Assn., 80 Va. 683 (I885); Northern Neck Mut. Fire Assn. v.
Turlington, 136 Va. 44, ri6 S.E. 363 (1923); Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 4o Wyo. i,
273 Pac. 667 (X929).

In addition, there are dicta in Kohen v. Mutual Reserve Fund Assn., 28 Fed. 705 (C.C. Mo.
1886); Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. McElroy, 83 Fed. 631 (C.C.A. 8th 1897); Heiman v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 Minn. I53 (1871); Haskin v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 78 Va. 700
(1894). See also Moon v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 83, 23 P. (2d) 444 (1933).
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An offer imposes no duty of action upon the offeree; there is no obligation
to accept or to reject it, or to take any notice of it. Silence is not to be
construed as acceptance, but rather is taken by reasonable men to indicate
that the offer has not been received, that it is still being considered, or
that it has been rejected.49 When the applicant hears nothing, he is free
to make inquiry, or to withdraw the offer and apply elsewhere, but he
may not assume acceptance.50 There is nothing about an insurance application to take the case out of ordinary contract rules.,, If the situation
were reversed, and the company were seeking to recover premiums,2 or
if the offer had been made by the company in the first instance5s silence
would not constitute acceptance. It is true that a duty to speak may be
imposed by special circumstances, 4 under which a reasonable man would
49 "A proposal not answered remains a proposal for a reasonable time, and is then regarded
as withdrawn. Both parties are interested in its acceptance, and both are expected to attend
to it with reasonable diligence." Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72 (1854). "Instead of silence being evidence of an agreement to do the thing requested, it is evidence, either that the
question was not heard, or that it was not intended to comply with the request. Especially is
this the case when, if a compliance was intended, the request would have been followed by an
actual doing of the thing requested." Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, rig Pa. St. 6, 12 Atl. 607

(1888).
so"If the appellant was dilatory in acting on the proposal, the deceased could have quickened its diligence by demanding prompt action; or, if not assenting to the delay, he could have
retracted his proposal, and reclaimed the money he had advanced, and his note. He had no
right, without action on his part, to rely on the supineness of the appellant, no greater than his
own, as an acceptance of the proposal." Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, 61 Ala. 163
(1878). See also Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, iig Pa. St. 6, 12 Adt. 607 (z888); Winchell v. Iowa
State Life Ins. Co., io3 Iowa 189, 72 N.W. 5o3 (i897); Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 154
Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929); Lamb v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 352, 252 Pac. 213 (1927);
Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
st "It is of course true that failure to act upon it may, in such a case as this, cause loss to
the applicant or to those to be named as beneficiaries in the policy, against which he expected
to secure protection. That situation is not, however, peculiar to the insurance law; for example, one may make an offer to buy goods which he needs at a certain price, having reason to believe the price will advance, and may incure loss through the failure of the one to whom it is
made to act upon the offer within a reasonable time." Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., ii6
Conn. 526, i65 Aft. 686 (1933).
S2Van Arsdale v. Osborne & Young, 21 Okla. 151, 95 Pac. 778 (igo8); Home Ins. Co. v.
Swam, 34 Ga. App. ig,128 S.E. 70 (1925).
s3Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305 (1898); Richmond v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 123 Tenn. 307,
130 S.W. 790 (igio), 3 o L.R.A. (N.S.) 954; Shakman v. United States Credit System Co., 92
Wis. 366, 66 N.W. 528 (i896), 32 L.R.A. 383, 53 Am. St. Rep. 92o; cf. New v. Germania Fire
Ins. Co., 171 Ind. 33, 85 N.E. 703 (igo8), 131 Am. St. Rep. 245; MacKelvie v. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. C., 287 Fed. 66o (C.C.A. 2d X923).
54 Restatement, Contracts, § 72, p. 78 (1932), Illustration of Subsection (i,c); cf. Lechler v.
Montana Life Ins. Co., 48 N.D. 644, i86 N.W. 271 (1921), 23 A.L.R. 1193, involving a renewal
policy, where relations between the parties had been such as to justify the offeror in expecting

a reply.
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not remain silent,s s and there are cases s 6 which have not gone unchallenged, s7 holding that where a salesman is given an order for so many
boxes of shoes, pickles or dried fish, his principal must act upon the offer
within a reasonable time,s ' or he will be deemed to have accepted it. But
an application for insurance usually contains an express provision9 that
the company shall incur no liability in connection with the application
until a formal policy has been issued and delivered; and no case has been
found, outside of the field of insurance law, holding silence to be acceptance, in the face of such an express statement.
II.RETENTION OF ADVANCE PAYMENTS AS ACCEPTANCE

Where the applicant pass all or part of the first premium to the agent
at the time of the application, the payment is of course conditional, and
is to be returned to the applicant if his offer is not accepted. Sometimes
this is expressly agreed, 6° but in all cases it is clearly understood. The
company has no right to retain the payment, unless it accepts the application; and when it does retain it beyond a reasonable time, it is argued
6
that this is acceptance. '
ss Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 Yale L. J.
i6g, 200 (1917).
56 Bluegrass Cordage Co. v. Luthy & Co., 98 Ky. 583, 33 S.W. 835 (i896); Cole-McIntyreNorfleet Co. v. Holloway, 4i Tenn. 679, 214 S.W. 817 (1919), 7 A.L.R. 1683; Peterson v.
Graham-Brown Shoe Co., 210 S.W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. igig); Hendrickson v. International
Harvester Co., ioo Vt. 16i, 135 Ati. 702 (1926); see 8 Minn. L. Rev. 250 (1924).
S7 Gould v. Cates Chair Co., i47 Ala. 629, 41 So. 675 (i9o6); Metzler v. Harry Kaufman
Co., 32 App. D. C. 434 (1909); Senner & Kaplan Co. v. Gera Mills, x85 App. Div. 562, 173

N.Y.S. 265 (1918). See also Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. &Lumber Co., 26 S.C. 61o, 2 S.E. Ix9
(1887).
58 "And thus it is that it is frequently said that one is ordinarily under no obligation to do
or say anything concerning a proposition which he does not choose to accept, yet we think that
when one sends out an agent to take such orders subject to his (the principal's) approval, fair
dealing and the exigencies of modem business require us to hold that he shall signify to the
customer within a reasonable time from the receipt of the order his rejection of it, or suffer the
consequences of having his silence operate as an approval." Hendrickson v. International
Harvester Co., ioo Vt. I61, 135 Ati. 702 (1926).
59 See note 8, supra.

60See Childers v. New YorkLife Ins. Co., 117 Okla. 7, 245 Pac. 59 (1925); Cloyd v. Republic
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 869, 22 P. (2d) 431 (1933).
61Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 6i Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (x899); Robinson v. United
States Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. 211 (1903), 102 Am. St. Rep. 436; Great Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 239 S.W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), reversed on rehearing 262 S.W. 475
(Te-. Comm. App. 1924). In Cloyd v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., X37 Kan. 869, 22 P. (2d)
431 (I933) and Steams v. Merchants' Life & Cas. Co., 38 N.D. 524, i65 N.W. $68 (1917),
acceptance was found upon the basis of express agreements that the payment would be returned if no policy was issued. See also Restatement, Contracts, § 72(2), p. 77 (1932).
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The difficulty with this argument is that the company has not "retained" the money; it has merely failed to return it. The applicant might
have it back at any time upon demand.6 2 The money was deposited with
the company's agent for a special purpose, pending a decision on the application. Until there has been a rejection, or the applicant has demanded
the money, the company's possession is still entirely consistent with the
original purpose, since there still may be acceptance. Under an application expressly providing that there shall be no insurance until the issuance
of a policy, it is difficult to see how failure to return a payment can amount
to acceptance; and until there has been a demand for its return, it is
doubtful whether there would be even a conversion of the money.
III. ESTOPPEL

This convenient catch-all has received occasional mention,1 apparently
upon the imperfectly conceived notion that the conduct of the company
has in some way misled the applicant into foregoing the opportunity to
obtain other insurance. Estoppel, properly so called, must be based upon
a representation of fact, in reliance upon which the applicant must have
been misled to his detriment. 64 The company has made no representation
of fact, and not even a promise; and unless we are to say that silence may
be relied upon as acceptance, 6s the applicant could scarcely. have been
misled as to the fact that he had no insurance, and the necessity of apply66
ing elsewhere.
IV. DATING BACK THE POLICY

Many insurance companies have followed the pernicious practice of
giving the policy, when issued, the date of the original application, and
61Cf. Stilwell v.

Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 83 Mo. App. 215 (19oo).
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899); Robinson v. United
States Ben. Soc., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. 211 (i9o3), 102 Am. St. Rep. 436; Great Southern
Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 239 S.W. 236 (Teax. Civ. App. 1922), reversed on rehearing 262 S.W. 475
'(Tex. Comm. App. 1924); see Richmond v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 123 Tenn. 307, 130 S.W. 79o
(igro), 3 o L.R.A. (N.S.) 954; cf. Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 152 La. 865, 94 So.
63

424 (1922).

64 Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, pp. 514-516 (2d ed. 1930); 33 Harv. L. Rev.
595 (I920).
6s See notes 49 and so, supra, and text.
66 The estoppel theory is rejected in More v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 537,
i89, 72 N.W. 503 (1897); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rudolph, 45 Tex. 454 (1876); cf.Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305
(i898); see Coker v. Atlas Acc. Ins. Co., 31 S.W. 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). See also Reed v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 73 S.W. (2d) 1027 (Mo. App. 1934). For the most part it has been ignored
by the courts. The cases cited in note 48 would appear, by implication at least, to reject it.
29 N.E. 757 (1892); Winchell v. Iowa State Ins. Co., IO3 Iowa
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requiring premiums to be paid on anniversaries of that date.6 This practice leads 'to a choice of two very unsatisfactory legal results. If it be
held that the insurance is not effective until the policy is issued, the applicant will have paid a premium covering the interval following the application, during which he will not have been covered by insurance. If, on the
other hand, it is held that the insurance is effective as of the date of application, it is possible that the applicant may receive protection for which
he pays no premium, since the application may be rejected, or withdrawn
before acceptance. Two reasonable solutions present themselves. If the
practice of the company, or anything in the application or the receipt
given, has misled the applicant into a belief that he is insured from the
earlier date, the agent should be held to have at least apparent authority
to make the contract, and the company should be bound without the issue
of a policy. 68 If such authority is dearly negatived, as it would seem to
be by an express provision in the application that there shall be no insurance until the policy is delivered, 69 then the date of the policy should be
disregarded, and future premiums held payable at proper intervals after
the applicant becomes insured. 70 It has been contended that the practice
of dating the policy back imposes on the company a contract obligation to
act promptly upon the application. 7x This seems entirely unsound.7 2 If
there is any contract at all, it is to insure forthwith. No reasonable interpretation of the conduct of either party could lead to any understanding
that the applicant is to pay a premium covering an interval during which
there is no insurance, provided that it be limited to the period reasonably
necessary for prompt action.
67 See the annotations in 6 A.L.R. 774 (1920); 32 A.L.R. 1253 (1924); also 3 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 634.
68Koivisto v. Bankers & Merchants Fire Ins. Co., 148 Minn. 255, i8i N.W. 580 (1921);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Haynes, io Ky. L. Rep. 276 (i888); Halle v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
22 Ky. L. Rep. 740, 58 S.W. 822 (I9oo).
69 Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 511, 216 N.W. 225 (1927).
7OMcMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 25 (i9oi); Stramback v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 94 Minn. 281, X02 N.W. 731 (19o5); Stinchcombe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46
Or. 316, 8o Pac. 213 (i9o5); Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 258 Mo. 659, 167 S.W.
951 (1914); Chestnut v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 208 Mo. App. 130, 232 S.W. 203 (1921).
7' De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (i924); Security Ins. Co.
v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 17I, 205 Pac. 151 (1922), 27 A.L.R. 444. And see Duffie v. Bankers' Life
Assn., 16o Iowa i9, 139 N.W. iO87 (I913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25.
2See the following cases, where the court refused to find any preliminary agreement,
notwithstanding this practice on the part of the company: Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v.
Mayes, 61 Ala. 163 (1878); Pickett v. German Fire Ins. Co., 39 Kan. 697, i8 Pac. 903 (1888);
Steinle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 8i Fed. 489 (C.C.A. 5 th 1897); Northwestera Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1026 (i9ii); More v. New York Bowery Fire Ins.
Co., 130 N.Y. 537, 29 N.E. 757 (1892); Shawnee Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McClure, 39 Okla. 535,
135 Pac. 1150 (1913); Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rudolph, 45 Tex. 454 (1876).
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. V. "IMPLIED

AGREEMENT" AND "QUASI-CONTRACT"

A few courts have attempted to spell out a liability based upon an

"implied" agreement, made at the time of the application, that the agent
will forward it promptly, and the company will act without delay.7 3 The
precarious nature of this theory has been recognized by terming the agreement "implied if not legal," 74 and "consensual, and therefore in the nature
of a quasi contractual liability. ' 75 Assuming that such an agreement can
be found, and that the agent has authority to make it, 76 the company

would of course be liable for its breach.
'tis undisputed that there is a clear moral obligation upon the company to act without unreasonable delay; and it may very well be that
there is a vague undefined understanding that it intends and is expected
to do so. But a contract implied in fact must rest upon the intent of the
parties; it requires an agreement, a meeting of minds, an intent to promise
and be bound; 77 it does not differ from an express contract, except that it
is circumstantially proved.78 Before the company can be held upon such
an agreement, it must be found as a reasonable implication from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties that it intended to bind itself
by a promise of prompt action.79 In the ordinary case, this is simply contrary to fact.Y° The form of the transaction indicates no such intent. 8'
73Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923); Fox v.
Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., i85 N.C. 121, ii6 S.E. 266 (1923); De Ford v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1o49 (1924); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash.
378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925); Brown v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 124 Okla. i55, 254 Pac. 7
(1927); Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 66, 235 N.W. 403 (i93).

Cf. also Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. oo9 (i918); Lewis v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 220 Ala. 270, 124 So. 889 (1929).
74Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923).
75Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. i66, 235 N.W. 4o3 (i93i).
76 Cf. Trask v. German Ins. Co., 53 Mo. App. 625 (1893).
77 i Wiliston, Contracts, § 3 (i92o).

78Lombard v. Rahilly, 127 Minn.449, 149 N.W. 95o (1914).
79"Before a court sustains an action brought on the implied contract of the insurance company, it must answer these questions. Is the implication a reasonable deduction from all the
circumstances and relations of the parties? And did the insurance company actually intend to
promise that it would act upon the application within a reasonable time?" Parkhill, Effect of
Delay in Acting upon an Application for Insurance, 7 Fla. Bar Assn. J. 219, 223 (1934).
80"The suggestion that the insurer or the agent promises to act promptly ignores actuality.
No such agreement is made expressly, nor can the intention to make one be implied. If a court
should hold that a contract to decide expeditiously on the proposal did exist, it is believed
that, within a short time, all insurance companies doing business in that jurisdiction would
incorporate in their applications stipulations expressly negativing any such promise." Funk,
The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 204, 224 (X927).
8,See notes 7 and 8, supra and text.
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But if agreement is to be implied, it requires consideration. This has
been found82 in the making of the application at the agent's solicitation.
This amounts to saying that an offer to contract is consideration for an
implied promise to act upon the offer-a proposition which is its own
refutation. Nor does payment of an advance premium to the agent, relied
upon in some cases,83 furnish the solution. The ownership of the money
paid does not pass to the company until it accepts the offer; in the meantime it is deposited with the agent for a special purpose, pending a decision
on the offer which it accompanies 5s The company in effect is given an
option to accept the application and the money; and a deposit in connection with an option, to be returned if it is not taken up, is not consideration.' 5
"Quasi-contract" is equally a false hope. The term is used properly in
cases where the plaintiff is reimbursed, or restored to his former status, to
6
avoid unjust enrichment of the defendant.1 The company has not been
enriched, since it holds the payment made merely in trust; and restoration of the applicant to his former status would involve at most a return
of the premium. If "quasi-contract" is used, as the Wisconsin court apparently employs it,87 in the sense of a consensual understanding which
is not a contract, it adds nothing to what has gone before.
The weakness of all theories based on contract has induced a number
5
of courts, following the leading case of Duffie v. Bankers' Life Assn.," to
seek to evolve some basis of liability in tort. The company's dealings with
the application are a departure from a reasonable standard of care. Pro8'Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla.

228, 222

Pac.

255 (1923).

Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (3923); De Ford v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. x46, 224 Pac. 2049 (1924); Kukuska v. Home Mut. HailTornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. i66, 235 N.W. 403 (i93i). Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Brady, 95 Ind. App. 564, 174 N.E. 99 (1932); Dunne v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 35 Wyo.
59, 246 Pac. 246 (1926).
84 "The money was paid upon a definite understanding in which the parties joined; it was
to be held by the insurer pending its decision whether to issue the policy or not; if it decided to
issue the policy the money was to be applied toward the first premium; but if it declined the
application the money was to be repaid to the applicant. The money so paid could not become
the property of the insurer until the policy was issued. The insurer held it in a fiduciary ca53

pacity, somewhat analogous to that in which a bank holds a special deposit." Swentusky v.
Prudential Ins. Co., ii6 Conn. 526, 165 Atl. 686 (i933).
83Cf. Friendly v. Elwert, 57 Or. 599, 112 Pac. 1o85 (i911).

1 Williston, Contracts, § 4 (1920); Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337 (1916).
87 Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. i66, 235 N.W. 403 (i93i).
88 Duffle v. Bankers' Life Assn., 16o Iowa i9,139 N.W. 1087 (I913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25.
86
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vided that a duty to- the applicant to use such care can be found, the
company may be liable for its negligence. Much ingenuity has been devoted to the discovery of such a duty.
VI. DUTY BASED ON FRANCHISE FROM STATE

The Duffie case first suggested19 that an insurance company, by doing
business under a franchise from the state, had assumed a duty toward the
public which required prompt action upon all applications submitted.
Later decisions9" have followed this lead, and have advanced the franchise
as one reason for tort liability.
The objection here is that there is nothing about a franchise, in itself,
to impose any such duty. All corporations have franchises, and it does
not appear that the obligations of the insurer would be altered if an individual were doing business.g9 An insurance company is not a public utility,
and the suggestion 92 that it is required to accept all suitable applications
never has been adopted by any court. The franchise merely gives the
corporate insurer the right to transact business as an individual might, 93
89 "This view overlooks the fact that the defendant holds and is acting under a franchise

from the state. The legislative policy, in granting this, proceeds upon the theory that chartering such association is in the interest of the public to the end that indemnity on specific contingencies shall be provided those who are eligible and desire it and for their protection the
state regulates, inspects, and supervises their business. Having solicited applications for insurance, and having so obtained them and received payment of the fees or premiums exacted,
they are bound either to furnish the indemnity the state has authorized them to furnish or decline so to do within such reasonable time as will enable them to act intelligently and advisedly
thereon or suffer the consequences flowing from their neglect to do so." Duffie v. Bankers' Life
Assn., 16o Iowa i9, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25.
90 De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Wilken v. Capital
Fire Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828,157 N.W. 1021 (19r6); Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171,
2o5 Pac. 151 (1922), 27 A.L.R. 444; Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228,
222 Pac. 255 (1924); Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 34 P. (2d) 731 (Cal. App. 1934); see Strand v.
Bankers' Life Ins. Co., i15 Neb. 357, 213 N.W. 349 (1927); Royal Neighbors of America v.
Fortenberry, 214 Ala. 387, 107 So. 836 (1926).
9, "Admitting all this, it is difficult to see the connection between the fact that the insurer
enjoys a corporate franchise and its duty to act in a particular case. If the insurer were a person instead of a corporation, the duty to act would be the same under the same circumstances.
In cases like this, the duty springs from the consensual acts of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances rather than any specific provision of law applicable to the holder of the franchise
as such." Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 66, 235 N.W. 4o3 (1931).
92See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. i89, 216 (1919).
93"Every corporation has a franchise from the state, but it never has been thought that
that fact changes as to corporations the elementary rule of the law of contracts and requires
that corporations shall accept or reject offers to enter into contracts within a reasonable time,
whereas individuals are not similarly restricted. The franchise but gives to a corporation the
right to transact business as an individual might, and subject to the same rules which govern
individuals." Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
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and should impose no more duty to act without delay upon applications
than would be required of a bank receiving a request for a loan. 94
VII. BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST

Associated with the concept of a duty imposed by the franchise is the
contention, also advanced in the Duffie case, and repeated in later decisions, 95 that insurance is a business so affected with a public interest that
the company is under a public obligation to act promptly. The public
interest is beyond dispute. There is no doubt that it will sustain the
constitutionality of legislation regulating the conduct of the business. 96
A statute which requires the company to act upon applications within a
reasonable time would be constitutional. 97 But such regulation is based
upon the police power, the exercise of which is exclusively for the legislature, and not for the courts; and the courts cannot impose a duty upon
insurers because the legislature might do so.98 The fact that the legislature has passed no such statute indicates, if anything, an intent that no
such obligation shall be imposed. 99 Banking is affected with a public in94 "The fact that the insurance companies are granted a franchise to do business in this
state does not and should not impose upon them the duty to consider promptly all who offer to
them the risk of insuring their lives, no more than would be required of a bank to lend money
promptly to all who should make application and suffer loss while the bank was negligent in
determining whether or not it would accept the offer and enter into a contract." Savage v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., r54 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929). See also Swentusky v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 At. 686 (1933); Miller v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 255 Ill.
App. 586
(1930); American Life Ins. Co. v. Nabors (Tex. Comm. App. 1934) 76 S.W. (2d) 497.
95Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. oo9 (i918); De Ford v. New
YorkLife Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924); Wilken v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 9 9Neb.
828, 57 N.W. 1021 (i9i6); Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., i8s N.C. 121, i6 S.E. 266
(1923); Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. i51 (1922), 27 A.L.R. 444;
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1924); Brown v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 124 Okla. 155, 254 Pac. 7 (1927); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins.
Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925).
96 Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (igo6), 7 Ann. Cas. 11o4 (mis-

representation); Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907) (suicide defense); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), L.R.A. 1915C i89 (rates); Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931) (compulsory arbitration);
O'Gorman &Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 25X (1931) (commissions of agents).
97National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).
98 "State regulation of insurance companies has its basis in the police power and by no
means in the public interest with which the insurance business is affected. The fact of public
interest is not the source of that power, it but affects the locus of the boundary line limiting its
exercise. And the police power is exclusively to be exercised by the Legislature, never by the
judicial branch of government. The courts cannot impose a duty on insurance companies by
virtue of a power which the courts do not possess and cannot exercise." Munger v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 918 (D.C. Mo. I933).
99"These very regulations, however, seem to the court to negative the claim of the plaintiffs in this suit. By reason of the fact that they are quasi public corporations, the Legislature
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terest, but it never has been suggested that a bank may be required to
act promptly on a requested loan;o0° employment is a matter of the greatest public interest, yet there is no duty to act without delay on an application for a job.," There is nothing in the business of insurance to call for
any different rule.102
VIII. DUTY OF THE AGENT TO FORWARD THE APPLICATION

The agent who takes the application does so in the course of his employment. If he owes any duty to the applicant to exercise due care in
dealing with it, and fails to do so-as by failure to forward it promptlyhis negligence is chargeable to the company. 0 3 The difficulty lies in finding any such duty. Early cases assumed it;104 later ones have accepted
has prescribed in certain respects what their duties are, particularly as regards the form of contract, but nowhere does the Legislature charge them with as broad a duty as the plaintiffs
herein claim. Except with respect to such changes as have been made by legislative enactment,
it does not appear that in our law there is any greater duty imposed upon the parties entering
into an insurance contract than is required in other contracts." Weatherby v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
ii NJ.M. 435, 167 Ati. 877 (1933).
100 Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 154 Miss. 89, i21
So. 487 (1929); Miller v. Illinois
Life Ins. Co., 355 Ill.
App. 586 (1930); 32 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (i934).
10'"No reason is apparent why an insurance contract should be regarded as of any more
interest to the public than a contract of employment. It is of as much importance to the public
that a person and his dependents have support during his lifetime (by wages or salary) as that
his beneficiaries have a competency (through insurance) after his death. Yet it has never been
held that delay in passing upon an application for employment affected the public interest to
the extent that it made the employer liable for all damages arising from such delay." Thornton
v. National Council Junior Order United American Mechanics, iro W.Va. 412, 158 S.E. 507
(i93i). See also Raysor v. Berkeley Co. Ry. & Lumber Co., 26 S.C. 61o, 2 S.E. rig (1887);
Hurley v. Eddingfield, i56 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. io58 (i90) (physician).
102 Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., ri6 Conn. 526, 165 Ati. 686 (i933); Schliep v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., i9 Minn. 479, 254 N.W. 618 (i934); American Life Ins. Co. v. Nabors,
76 S.W. (2d) 497 (Tex. Comm. App. 1934).
103 "If the agent only be considered, it is clear enough that he would be liable if his negligent
retention of the application prevented its timely acceptance. Since he was merely the arm of
the defendant, the obligation resting upon him was the obligation of the defendant. Therefore
the duty of the defendant to secure prompt transmission of the application from the solicitor's
field to the central office is quite apparent." Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86
Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912), 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 164, Ann. Cas. I915A 671.
To the contrary is Four States Grocer Co. v. Wickendon, 217 S.W. 1103 (Tex. Civ. App.
igig), holding that where a salesman took an order for three bales of duck and failed to forward it, his negligence was not chargeable to his employer, because "the employer was in no
sense a party to the transaction of taking the order." The case is criticized in 29 Yale L. J.

673 (1920).
104 Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., xi Hawaii 69 (1897); Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut.
Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912), 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 164, Ann. Cas. i95A 671.
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the assumption,15 and the basis for it is dearly stated nowhere. It has
been said that:
there was sufficient danger to the plaintiff to be apprehended from delay in closing the

transaction that a reasonably prudent business man, guided by the considerations
which ordinarily regulate conduct, would have acted with diligence.06

But, as Mr. Funk has pointed out, 0 7 this merely begs the question; regardless of the apprehension of danger to another, even a reasonably prudent business man is not required to act with diligence, unless he is under
a legal duty to do so. It has been said 108 that "equity considers that as
done which ought to have been done"; but this assumes that the company
was under some obligation to take action, which is the thing to be
proved,x°9 and is at best a poor reason for affording relief in a tort action
at law. There has been mention"' of an "implied agreement" based on
the agent's receipt of the application and the premium; but it should be
evident that they have been received by the agent as the representative
of the company, and that he has assumed no obligations which the company would not itself assume if the transaction had been direct.'
IX. THE AGENT AS TRUSTEE

In a Nebraska case liability has been rested upon the principle that the
agent, when he receives payment of the premium, becomes a trustee of the
money, and "negligent or inexcusable delay on the part of a trustee is a
wrong, if it deprives the beneficiary of the use of a trust fund which has
served its purpose as such."' 2 Assuming that the agent has become a
trustee, and that one of the agreed terms of the trust is that the money
11

105Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac. IOog (1918); Wilken v. Capital
Fire Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828, i57 N.W. 1021 (z916); Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. I71,
205 Pac. rSr (1922), 27 A.L.R. 444; Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232
Pac. 346 (1925); Lewis v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 22o Ala. 270,
124 So. 889 (1929); cf. Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 185 N.C. 121, ii6 S.E. 266 (1923).
10o Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912), 4 o L.R.A.

(N.S.) z64, Ann. Cas. x9i1A 671.
1°7

Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev.

207, 214 (1927).
lag Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., ix Hawaii 69 (1897); Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 34
P. (2d) 731 (Cal. App. 1934).

109 See Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. SoC.,

2 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
nSo
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 95 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923); De Ford
v. New York State Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. X46, 224 Pac. xo49 (1924); Dyer v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925). Cf. Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31
Idaho 481, 174 Pac. IOO9 (xg98).
-x See notes 73 to 8s supra inclusive, and text.
- Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., iIs Neb. 357, 213 N.W. 349 (1927). Cf. also Fox v.

Volunteer StateLife Ins. Co., I85 N.C. 121, 1i6 S.E. 266 (1923), where the agent was said to be
a "trustee" of the policy after it was issued, and the company held liable for his delay in delivery.
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will not be retained after a lapse of a reasonable time, if the application
is not accepted, then the trust requires only that the payment be returned
to the applicant; and its enforcement, which properly would be in equity
rather than in a tort action at law, would appear to be limited to the
restoration of the trust fund. It does not follow that there is any agreement to act on the application, or any responsibility for loss resulting
from failure to do so."13 The agent can be held to no greater duty than
would rest upon the company if direct payment had been made.
X. AFFnMATIVE CONDUCT

It has been suggested"*4 that the duty of the agent to use care in dealing
with the application may be based on the principle, familiar in negligence
cases,"15 that one who enters upon an affirmative undertaking, to perform a gratuitous service for another, is required to exercise reasonable
care in performing it, to avoid injury to the beneficiary of the undertaking. The ancient distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance
finds support in cases involving brokers and others who undertake to procure insurance. If there is nothing more than a voluntary promise, there
is no obligation to carry it out; , 6 but once the defendant has entered upon
the undertaking by some affirmative act, he may be liable for negligence if
he abandons it, or fails to use proper care." 7 Insurance agents who take
applications, particularly where they receive premiums, may be said to
have entered definitely upon a course of affirmative conduct, and be liable
for misfeasance if they unreasonably delay.
113 "The declaration of the Supreme Court of Nebraska that the basis of the asserted duty,
when an advance premium has been paid, is the obligation incumbent on a trustee faithfully to
discharge his trust, assumes a trust agreement including an agreement, expressed or implied,
that what has been paid will not be held indefinitely if the application is not accepted. If this
be granted, the full duty of the trustee is to return the premium advanced. The further assumption that the trustee has agreed to act one way or the other on the application and has therefore a contractual duty to act begs the whole question as to whether there is such a duty.
Moreover, the enforcement of a trust, and the awarding of damages incidental to its violation,
is for equity, not for a court of law." Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914,
917 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
114Budge, C. J., concurring specially in Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481,
174 Pac. 1oo9 (i918); 3 Minn. L. Rev. 53 (I918).
11 Harper, Treatise on the Law of Torts, § 8i, pp. 200-2o6 (i933); Bohlen, Studies in the
Law of Torts, p. 8o (1926).
116Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (18o9); Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268

N.Y.S. 192 (933).
17 Siegel v. Spear & Co., 245 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1925), 26 A.L.R. 1205; Barile v.
Wright, 256 N.Y. i, 175 N.E. 35i (r93i); Condon v. Exton-Hall Brokerage & Vessel Co., 8o
Misc. 369, 142 N.Y.S. 548 (i913); Backus v. Ames, 79 Minn. 145, 81 N.W. 766 (igoo); Criswell v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 30 N.E. 1101, 32 N.E. 814 (1892); Rezac v. Zima, 96 Kan. 752,
r53 Pac. 500 (1915), Ann. Cas. 19 i8B 1o35; Evan L. Reed Mfg. Co. v. Wurts, 187 Ill. App.
378 (1914).
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This argument is entitled to respect. The objection to it would appear
to be, that in the broker cases the one who undertakes to procure insurance is assuming a voluntary agency for the plaintiff, and so owes him a
duty to protect him by proper care. At least he is not a hostile party, or
dealing at arm's length. But the insurance agent here is not the agent of
the applicant, or primarily responsible to him. He is the agent of the
company, and his undertaking is that of the company.
Whether or not he owes a duty to act promptly on the application depends on just
the same considerations as whether the company owes any duty to act on the proposal
within a reasonable time.'
It never has been held that the rule as to affirmative undertakings extends to the offeree who is dilatory in dealing with an offer," 9 and there
would appear to be no reason why it should extend to his agents.
Even assuming that it can be established, upon one or another of the
foregoing theories, that the insurance company has violated a duty to
the applicant, other difficulties remain. It is not at all clear that the defendant's negligence has been the proximate cause of any injury to the
plaintiff. It would be absurd to say that the company has caused the
actual loss which has occurred. At most it has caused the applicant to remain uninsured. Notwithstanding some occasional confusion in the
cases, 20 it seems clear that the insurance of which he has been deprived
is not that which might have been written by the defendant company,
since he had no right to assume that his application would be accepted.
If anything, he has lost the opportunity, or expectancy, of obtaining insurance from another company.' 2 ' Granted that this is a legal right, or
interest, what is its value? Normally very little, since the premium he
must pay for insurance will equal its worth. The especial importance
which the expectancy has for this plaintiff arises from the fact that he
has suffered a loss; but for this the defendant is in no way responsible.
Should such especial value be an element of damages? Suppose that A
is negotiating with B for the sale of A's horse, and C wrongfully persuades
B not to enter into the contract. Thereafter A's horse dies. C has interfered with an expectancy-should he pay for the loss of the horse? And
is it even dear that the insurance company has deprived the applicant
"
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207, 219 (1927).

See Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., ii6 Conn. 526, 533, 165 Atl. 686, 688 (ig33).
-o See Winn v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 216 Iowa I249, 25o N.W. 459 (i933);
Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., i85 N.C. 121, ii6 S.E. 266 (923).
-1 Duffie v. Bankers' Life Assn., i6o Iowa ig, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25;
Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., II5 Neb. 357, 213 N.W. 349 (1927); Wallace v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (I933); Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F. (2d)
19

696 (C.C.A. 7th

193o).
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of his expectancy? He might obtain other insurance even yet, if no loss
had occurred, and defendant has not caused the loss.122
But even if we are to regard the defendant's conduct as creating the
risk of "loss without insurance," it would seem that the applicant should
be required to exercise reasonable care for his own protection. The company has delayed an unreasonable length of time. The applicant has an
equal interest in the fate of the application. Unless he has at least made
inquiry of the agent, and received assurances that the matter would be
taken care of, can it be said that his failure to withdraw his offer and seek
other insurance is caused by the defendant's delay, or by anything but
23
his own willingness to afford additional time for consideration?1 It
should at least appear, not only that he was eligible for insurance,124 but

that after the lapse of a reasonable time he was in fact induced by the
5
company's conduct to forego a possible attempt to obtain it elsewhere.12
There is an astonishing lack of any such evidence in the cases imposing
liability.
Finally, in the case of life insurance, there is the problem of the party
who is to bring the action. The applicant, to whom any duty primarily
was owing, is dead. The beneficiary, who is the one party with any real
expectancy of getting the money, is almost unanimously denied recovery,12 6 upon the ground that the company has no relations with him, and
- "Certainly then his ability to procure insurance has been terminated, but is that inability to procure insurance proximately caused by the inaction of the company so that that
could be considered in determining the measure of A's damages by such inaction? I think A's
inability then to procure insfrance is proximately caused by his death, and not by the inaction
of the company on his application for insurance. The damages, if any, which he had before he
met with accident certainly cannot all at once be multiplied a hundred fold by an event for
which the company is not responsible and having no causal connection with its inaction on his
application for insurance." Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 92o (D.C.
Mo. 1933).
- See Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72 (1854); Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes,

61 Ala. 163 (1878); Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, rig Pa. St. 6, 12 At. 607 (i888); Winchell v.
Iowa State Ins. Co., io3 Iowa 189, 72 N.W. 5o3 (1897); Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,
154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929); Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (D.C.
Mo. 1933). Cf. Lamb v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 352, 252 Pac. 213 (1927); Moon v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 83, 23 P. (2d) 444 (I933).
=4 There is general agreement that if the applicant was not an acceptable risk, there is no
liability upon the company. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 14o S.W.
1026

(i9ii); Dorman v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 41 Okla. 509, 139 Pac.

262

(1914); Gon-

soulin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 152 La. 865, 94 So. 424 (1922); Moon v. Central States
Fire Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 83, 23 P. (2d) 444 (1933); Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212
Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933); Weaver v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 42 P. (2d) 729 (Mont.
1935); see Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 7th 1930).

- Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (i933); see Behnke v.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 4r F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 7th 1930).
,A Royal Neighbors of America v. Fortenberry, 214 Ala. 387, 107 So. 846 (x926); Veser v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 44 Ohio App. 293, 185 N.E. 565 (1932); Stray v. Western States Life
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its duty did not extend to him.127 If the administrator of the decedent's
estate is to bring the action, it must be because some right of the decedent
has survived, for obviously the cause of action has accrued before death,
and the estate has suffered no new injury after death. If the action is in
tort,128 the problem is to find some statute which will permit it to survive.11 9 In any event, it would seem that the estate should recover nothing
more than nominal damages, since the prospective insurance money would
not be payable to the estate, and the defendant has not caused the actual
loss. I 0
The infinite variety of these legal theories, not yet withered by age or
made stale by custom, suggests that there is no real logical basis for liability, and that the recent cases which have denied it's3 are those which

ultimately will be followed.32 If there is "a great need for the courts to
Ins. Co., x63 Wash. 329, 300 Pac. 1o46 (r931); Forck v. Prudential Ins. Co., 66 S.W. (2d) 983
(Mo. App. 1933). See also Duffie v. Bankers' Life Assn., x6o Iowa i9, 139 N.W. 1o87 (1913),
46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25; De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924).
App. 586 (1930).
Cf. Miller v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 255 Ill.
=7 Both Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L.
Rev. 207, 225 (1927), and Parkhill, Effect of Delay in Acting upon an Application for Insurance, 7 Fla. Bar Assn. J. 219, 224 (1934), argue in favor of a recovery by the beneficiary, upon
the ground that the "expectancy" of insurance protection is really in him, and that as a third
party beneficiary of the prospective contract, he is entitled to relief. There is no support for
this conclusion except a dictum in Thornton v. National Council Junior Order United American
W.Va. 412, i58 S.E. 507 (i93i), and an overruled decision in Texas. American
Mechanics, 0io
Life Ins. Co. v. Nabors, 48 S.W. (2d) 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), reversed in 76 S.W. (2d) 497
(Tex. Comm. App. 1934).
-8 Hence the attempt to base the tort action upon a duty arising out of an implied contract.
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346 (1925).
129The Colorado statute quite clearly provides for survival. De Ford v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924). Also apparently that of Iowa. Iowa, Code (1924),
§ 10957; Duffie v. Bankers' Life Assn., 16o Iowa ig, 193 N.W. 1087 (1113), 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 25.
The statutes of Oklahoma and Washington apparently contemplate the survival only of actions based on contract. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac.
255 (1923); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346*(1925). The Missouri statute has been construed not to permit survival. Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,
2 F. Supp. 914 (D.C. Mo. 1933). In general, actions for torts other than personal torts may
survive, 3 Schouler, Law of Wills, Executors and Administrators § 2188, p. 2080 (6th ed. 1923);
but there is no common law precedent for the survival of such an action as this, and the matter
would seem to be controlled entirely by the wording of the statute.
13o Thornton v. National Council Junior Order United American Mechanics, rio W.Va. 412,
I58 S.E. 507 (I93I); Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ.
Pa. L.Rev. 207 (1927). Cf. Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 381, 129 N.E. 171 (1920).
131 See note 4, supra.
132 The prediction of Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75
Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 207, 226 (1927), that "if a survey be made in years hence, it will be found
that the insurer, in the majority of instances, will have been required to answer in damages for
its negligent delay," does not appear to have been borne out, at least in the later cases.
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recognize the position of guardianship occupied by the insurer in society
and to endow the insurer with a responsibility for efficient action greater
than is required of the corner grocer,"'33 it should at least be done outright by judicial fiat, instead of warping established concepts to produce
a "novel, interesting and rather surprising"'' 34 result. It would perhaps
be better still to leave such legislation where it properly belongs, ss and
to solve the problem by the passage of statutes similar in character to
that of North Dakota."6
If such a statute is to be proposed, it would seem that it should begin
by fixing a definite period within which the insurance company shall be
required to communicate its acceptance or rejection of the application.
A provision for a "reasonable time"' 37 is a mere invitation to litigation.
The time might vary with the type of insurance: hail insurance might very
well require no more than twenty-four hours, s s while fire insurance, where
investigation may be necessary, might require at least a week, while life
insurance might call for as much as a month1 39 Since virtually all of the
X
decisions imposing liability have involved a prepayment of the premium, 40
the statute might perhaps be limited to cases where some advance pay(193o); note, x3 B. U. L. Rev. 734 (1933).
'34 Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance § 64, p. x9o (2d ed. 1930).
13s "It is apparent that if liability is here to be imposed in an action ex delicto, this court will
133 Note,

40 Yale L. J. 121,

127

be compelled to engage in judicial legislation. If and when it is desired to impose upon insurers additional burdens or requirements, the same should come through the legislative department of the government, and not by virtue of judge-made law." Olson, 3., in Schliep v.
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 1i1 Minn. 479, 488, 254 N.W. 6r8 (i934).
"Now, when the mills, called Parliaments and Congresses and Legislatures, grind out new
laws unceasingly to meet the real or imagined demands of changed and changing times, courts
may well restrain themselves to the discharge of their true function, the interpretation of the
law that is, not the making of the law as it should be. As for myself, proceeding super antiquas
vias, I shall not say that because there ought to be a law requiring an insurance company to
act within a reasonable time on an application for insurance, therefore that is the law." Otis, J.,
in Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914, 917, 198 (D.C. Mo. 1933).
036r N.D. Comp. L. (1913), § 4902, held constitutional in Wanberg v. National Union Fire

Ins. Co., 46 N.D. 369, 179 N.W. 66o (i92o); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260
U.S. 71 (1922). The statute requires all writers of hail insurance to act upon applications with-

in twenty-four hours.
137 Proposed in note, io Wis. L. Rev. 289 (i935).
138 The North Dakota statute allows twenty-four hours (see note 136, supra). In Boyer v.
State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912), 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) z64,
Ann. Cas. 19i5A 671, a finding that a delay of three days in forwarding the application was unreasonable, was upheld.
'39 In Harp v. Grangers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 49 Md. 307 (1878); Evans v. International Life
Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 264, 252 Pac. 266 (1927); Meyer v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 1o3 Neb.
640, 173 N.W. 578 (igrg); and Winn v. John Hancock Mut.-Life Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 1249, 250
N.W. 459 (1933), delays approaching a month were held to furnish no evidence of negligence.
X40

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 95 Ind. App. 564, 174 N.E. 99 (1932); Dunne v.

Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 35 Wyo. 59, 246 Pac. 246 (1926).
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ment has been made, upon the ground that there is little likelihood that
the applicant will be misled by the belief that he is certain to receive protection, unless he has paid for it; but this may be debatable.'1' The liability of the insurer might properly be limited to losses occurring before
the applicant has a reasonable opportunity to obtain other insurance,: 42
or within a definite period after the expiration of the time for action. In
the case of life insurance, the action should be vested in the beneficiary,'43
to avoid the possibility that the proceeds will go to satisfy creditors, or
be distributed to other parties.'44
Such a statute would deprive insurance companies of the possibility,
which seems now to be open to them,' 4 of inserting in the application an
express provision that, if the offer is not accepted within a definite time,
it shall be deemed to have been rejected.'4 6 At present, there seems to be
no reason why such a provision should not protect the company against
48
liability1 47 In violation of a statute, it could of course have no effect.1
141See note, io Wis. L. Rev. 289 (1935).
142 Note, io Wis. L. Rev. 289 (935).
The proposed wording is: "Whenever any person
shall be damaged, whether by reason of the company's unreasonable failure to accept or reject
an application before a loss occurs, or whether by reason of such unreasonable delay the applicant has not had opportunity to amend his application or to insure elsewhere before such loss
occurs, the company shall be liable as though the application had been accepted, but the policy
not yet delivered."
143 Note, io Wis. L. Rev. 292 (x935). The proposed wording is: "In the case of life insurance, the right to recover under this section shall vest in the same person or persons as though
the policy had been issued at the time of the applicant's death."
'44 In In re Coughlin's Estate, 53 N.D. 188, 2o5 N.W. 14 (1925), the proceeds were held exempt, under a statute providing that the "avails" of an insurance policy should not be subject
to the debts of the deceased. It does not follow that the same result would be reached under a
less liberal wording.
'14 See Jones, Tort or No Tort, 56 Chi. Leg. N. 366 (1924), 2 Proceedings Assn. of Life Ins.
Counsel 389; Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L.

Rev. 207, 225 (1927).
146The clause proposed by Jones (see note 145, supra) is as follows: "The Company shall be
entitled to ........ days from the date of this application within which to consider and act upon
same; and if a policy has not been received by me, or if I have not received notice of the approval or rejection of this application within that period, then this application will be deemed
to have been declined by the Company."
147 See Stilwell v. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 83 Mo. App. 215 (1oo). Cf. the provision in
Stearns v. Merchants' Life & Cas. Co., 38 N.D. 524, 165 N.W. 568 (1917), providing for the
return of the premium paid within twenty days if the policy was not issued, which was held
to give the Company an option to decline within twenty days.
Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly upon an Application, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev.
207, 225 (1927), considers that such a clause would not protect the company against liability
for loss occurring within the stated period, if it could be shown that the company could have
acted earlier but failed to do so.
z48 Wanberg v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 46 N.D. 369, 179 N.W. 66o (1920); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).

